Awesome Reviewers

Treat every point where data crosses a trust boundary — server to client, client to server, or internal module to external provider — as a security checkpoint, not a pass-through.

• Never leak secrets in outbound responses. Credentials needed server-side (e.g. AWS sessionToken, API keys) must be stripped before serializing create/list/detail/update responses, even though the raw value stays available internally for signing requests. Centralize this in a single serializer so every endpoint benefits:

  function toProviderConnectionResponse(connection) {
    const { sessionToken, ...safe } = connection.providerSpecificData ?? {};
    return { ...connection, providerSpecificData: safe };
  }
  

• Never reflect untrusted upstream/user content verbatim into responses or UI. Strip HTML/script content and clamp length before surfacing error bodies, titles, or other external text, to avoid XSS.
• Honor explicit security/privacy constraints set by the caller (e.g. external_web_access: false) rather than silently rerouting the request through a broader-scoped path; when such a flag is present, bypass the feature entirely instead of weakening the guarantee.
• When building internal/trusted identifiers that will later be treated as privileged (reserved tool names, internal flags, special routes), check for collisions with client-supplied data first and bail out of the rewrite if the name is already taken — otherwise untrusted input can impersonate a trusted mechanism and get executed with elevated trust.

Add a regression test for each boundary-crossing fix (e.g. asserting a secret is absent from every response, or that reserved names can’t be hijacked) so these protections can’t silently regress.</description> </invoke>

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