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Security-sensitive controls must be enforced at the boundary (before business logic) and granted with the minimum required scope. Avoid designs where access is only checked after the request reaches handlers or where automation receives broad credentials.

Apply this as follows:

• API/Admin authorization
  • If using Cognito for authentication, also enforce authorization (e.g., admin group membership) in a gateway/front-door authorizer so unauthorized callers are rejected before any Lambda handler runs.
  • Do not replicate group checks inside multiple handlers unless the gateway approach is impossible; it’s easy to miss a route and it still allows business logic to execute.

  Example (pattern):

  • Keep your existing Cognito authorizer.
  • Add a second (custom) authorizer that denies invoke unless cognito:groups contains the admin group.

  Pseudocode for the custom authorizer decision:

  // In custom Lambda authorizer
  const groups = event.requestContext.authorizer.claims['cognito:groups'] || [];
  const isAdmin = Array.isArray(groups) ? groups.includes('admin') : false;
  if (!isAdmin) {
    return generatePolicy('Deny', event.methodArn);
  }
  return generatePolicy('Allow', event.methodArn);
  

• Automation/CI permissions
  • Scope GitHub Actions permissions to least privilege at the workflow level, then override per-job. Grant id-token: write only to jobs that need OIDC role assumption; other jobs should use only contents: read or similarly minimal scopes.

  Example:

  permissions: read-all
  jobs:
    unit:
      permissions:
        contents: read
    e2e:
      permissions:
        contents: read
        id-token: write
  

Outcome: fewer authorization gaps across routes and fewer accidental credential overexposures in CI, improving overall security posture.

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