Awesome Reviewers

When invoking CLI/shell or external tools, treat all generated/ingested content (LLM output, web research, imported facts) as untrusted and never embed it directly into command-line strings.

Instead, use a file-based contract:

• Write untrusted text to a skill-controlled file in a fixed workspace directory.
• Pass only a trusted, system-generated file path (e.g., {brief_file}) into the invoke command/template.
• Ensure the brief text itself never becomes part of shell/CLI arguments, where characters like quotes/backticks/$() could be interpreted.

Example pattern:

# Untrusted brief content is written to disk by the skill.
# The engine invocation receives only a file path.
[[workflow.engines]]
code = "agy"
kind = "cli"
invoke = 'agy -p "{brief_file}" --dangerously-skip-permissions'

Apply this rule consistently across:

• CLI invocation templates
• Any orchestration layer that currently interpolates text into commands
• Any “delegate engine”/external-tool integration where prompts, claims, or citations might contain shell metacharacters

Goal: prevent command/argument injection driven by indirect prompt injection while improving reliability by keeping inputs structured and escaping-free.

This site is open source. Improve this page.