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Always validate and constrain any user-controlled or data-driven strings (IDs, slugs, CLI flags, manifest/CSV fields) before using them to build paths, filenames, or subprocess commands, and apply defense-in-depth against common classes of attacks.

Practical rules:

• Prefer allowlists: validate identifiers with tight regexes (e.g., lowercase slug patterns). Reject anything that doesn’t match.
• Block traversal/path escapes: for anything used as a filename/path segment, reject values containing .., path separators (/ or \), or unexpected whitespace.
• Avoid shell interpolation: when spawning processes, use APIs that take argument arrays (e.g., execFileSync) instead of building a shell command string.
• Protect object maps: when constructing objects from dynamic keys, use Object.create(null) and reject dangerous keys like __proto__, prototype, and constructor.
• Keep validator strictness consistent with runtime consumers: don’t broaden accepted input in validation (e.g., don’t implicitly .trim() a field if runtime parsing does not).

Example pattern (safe subprocess + strict slug + path-segment guard):

const path = require('node:path');
const fs = require('node:fs');
const { execFileSync } = require('node:child_process');

const SLUG_RE = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$/;
function assertSafeSlug(slug) {
  if (!SLUG_RE.test(slug)) throw new Error(`Invalid slug: ${slug}`);
}

function zipBundle({ bundlesDir, distDir, slug }) {
  assertSafeSlug(slug);
  const srcDir = path.join(bundlesDir, slug);
  const outZip = path.join(distDir, `${slug}.zip`);
  fs.mkdirSync(distDir, { recursive: true });

  // No shell interpolation
  execFileSync('zip', ['-r', '-X', '-q', outZip, slug, '-x', '*.DS_Store'], {
    cwd: bundlesDir,
    stdio: 'inherit',
  });
}

Apply this check any time code does one of these: writes files, reads files by derived paths, constructs regexes from inputs, or spawns external commands using derived arguments.

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