Adopt a consistent rule: anything coming from persistence, other platforms/accounts, terminal escape sequences, or secret-managed inputs must be validated/normalized and handled with collision-safe, non-injectable, non-leaky logic. Apply this as standards: - **Path portability & sync safety:** When persisting selections that may be synced, only mark as “syncable” if you can reliably interpret it under the current installation root. For custom theme paths, serialize as relative *only* when the absolute path is under the current `themes_dir()`. Preserve “foreign” absolute paths (don’t attempt partial cross-platform legacy inference). - **Test traversal + platform differences:** Include unit tests for `..`/parent traversal behavior and add Windows-specific coverage where paths/roots differ. - **Shell command construction:** Never interpolate user- or data-derived strings into shell commands without a quoting strategy. Use a single helper (e.g., POSIX-safe single-quote escaping) and route all shell-sensitive formatting through it. - **Secret injection precedence:** When turning secrets into environment/config, define precedence and do not override worker-injected env vars. Insert typed auth secrets atomically, and skip on collisions to avoid unintended behavior or privilege changes. - **Secret file permissions:** When writing secret-bearing config files, create parent dirs if needed and enforce restrictive permissions (e.g., `0o600`) on Unix. - **Parsing hardening & logging:** Avoid panics on malformed/unexpected structured input (use bounds checks/early exits). Don’t log raw untrusted substrings at debug/info levels if terminal/PTY content could contain echoed secrets. - **Endpoint/target allowlists:** Prevent local-only configuration (e.g., local Ollama URLs) from being sent through remote/request settings. Example patterns (condensed): ```rust // 1) Shell quoting helper fn shell_single_quote(value: &str) -> String { format!("'{}'", value.replace("'", "'\\''")) } // 2) Secret env insertion with collision safety fn build_secret_env_vars(secrets: &HashMap) -> HashMap { let mut env_vars = HashMap::new(); for (secret_key, secret) in secrets { // typed secrets: if any env var is already set non-empty, skip that secret entirely // (and never override existing process env) for (env_name, env_value) in typed_secret_entries(secret) { if std::env::var(env_name).is_ok_and(|v| !v.is_empty()) { continue; // collision: skip } env_vars.insert(OsString::from(env_name), OsString::from(env_value)); } } env_vars } ```